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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the United States enacted the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (FCMA)' which extended exclusive fishery
management authority, to 200 nautical miles off the nation's
coast.3 The legislation was designed not only to maintain fish
stocks and rebuild stocks of overfished species,' but also to pro-
mote domestic commercial and recreational fishing' by
establishing a national priority system.' The possibility of so-
called "joint ventures"7 in which fish harvested by United States
fishermen would be delivered to foreign processing vessels in the
fishery conservation zone (FCZ)' was perceived as a loophole in
the FCMA. Onshore processors demanded that the FCMA be
amended to clarify that the fishery conservation zone was
established to promote the development of not only the fishermen
but the entire fishing industry and to limit joint ventures which
hindered the development of new onshore processing capacity.,
An amendment to the FCMA,' ° hastily passed in the summer of
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ographic Institution's Marine Policy and Ocean Management Program.
** B.S. Chem, University of Georgia (1969); J.D., University of Georgia School of Law
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16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
' Id. § 1812 (1976).
Id. § 1811.
Id. § 1801(a)(2) and (b)(1).
Id. § 1801(b)(3).
Id. § 1821(d).
The arrangements between United States fishermen and foreign vessels are not joint
ventures in the legal sense of the phrase. If considered as a more general term, the usage is
still inaccurate because the term could be used to describe a myriad of international
business arrangements. However, since the term has been commonly used for these trans-
actions and the 1978 amendments to the FCMA have even been dubbed the "Joint Venture
Amendments," the term will be used in this paper.
- 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (1976).
See, e.g., Fishery Conservation and Management Act Oversight: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 62,
88-90 (1978) (statements of Edward Furia and Lee Weddig) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Oversight Hearings].
10 Joint Venture Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519 (1978).
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1978, created a United States processor preference for American-
harvested fish similar to the fishermen's priority in the FCZ;
however, the amendment also specifically authorized joint ven-
tures for that part of the domestic harvest which the United
States processors have no capacity or intent to process.
This Article will present the background of the joint venture
amendment and an analysis of the major problems involved in im-
plementing the legislation. Current joint ventures and their effect
on the United States fishing industry will also be discussed.
II. BACKGROUND
Foreign fishing off the coasts of the United States reached a
peak in 1971 when foreign fleets harvested record catches." In the
following years, foreign catches declined due to the depletion of
certain stocks and the imposition of quotas by the International
Convention of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF).2 ICNAF
had no real enforcement mechanism, however, and the United
States believed that the organization was an ineffective means of
managing already dangerously depleted fish stocks. 3 With the in-
stitution of the United States fishery conservation zone, foreign
fishermen were limited to only that part of the optimum yield 4 of
a fishery that United States fishermen could not harvest.'5 Lower
allocations, as well as time, area and gear restrictions, resulted in
a 1977 foreign catch in the FCZ of less than half of the 1971
catch. 6 In addition, the clear policy of the United States was to
develop the American capacity to harvest the entire optimum
yield and eventually to exclude foreign fishermen completely."
" 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(6)(B)(i) (1976).
it See Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step
Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 445 (1977);
Warner, The Politics of Fish, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 1977, at 41; and U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
U.S. OCEAN POLICY IN THE 1970s: STATUS AND ISSUES 111-5, Fig. 3-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as U.S. OCEAN POLICY].
I" See Magnuson, supra note 12, at 444-45. See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(2)-(4) (1976).
" See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18) (1976). The optimum yield (OY) of a fishery is the amount of
fish that will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, based on not only a
biological assessment of maximum sustainable yield, but also relevant social, economic and
ecological factors.
" Id. § 1821(d).
" See U.S. OCEAN POLICY, supra note 12, at 111-4, Fig. 3-2 and 111-5, Fig. 3-3. See also 16
U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(7)(F) (1976).
"T Id. at 111-32. It has been visualized that once American fishermen are relieved of
foreign competition in the FCZ, the opportunity for larger catches and the incentive for
new investment will lead to the development of a United States fishing fleet capable of
utilizing the entire OY.
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Fish products provide a major portion of the nations' protein
and serve as a major export for many of the countries that fish
within the FCZ."8 Countries such as Japan, Korea, Poland and the
U.S.S.R. have relied upon extensive, technologically-advanced,
distant water fishing fleets, but the advent of virtually world-wide
200-mile fishery or economic zones has limited the production and
economic feasibility of many of these fleets. Understandably,
these countries have attempted to find new means of guarantee-
ing an adequate supply of fishery products while at the same time
protecting the enormous investment in their distant water fleets. 9 .
International joint ventures involving United States fishermen
and foreign processing vessels seemed to provide one-possible
means of alleviating the problem.
Although international joint ventures are common vehicles for
fisheries operations in other parts of the world," this type of joint
venture had never been proposed for United States fishermen
prior to the enactment of the FCMA. Opponents take the position
that the joint ventures are merely a means of circumventing the
FCMA and perpetuating foreign domination of certain United
States fisheries. More importantly, the opponents argue, onshore
processors cannot compete with foreign processing vessels that
are not subject to United States wage, safety and health re-
quirements." New investment necessary for development of pro-
cessing capacity for underutilized species could suffer because of
the competition.
Advocates of the arrangements point out that joint ventures
have been proposed only for species for which there is little or no
United States processing capacity." The joint ventures would not
only transfer the technology necessary to open up new fisheries
for United States fishermen, but also provide an immediate
market.23 Proponents also argue that the creation of joint ven-
tures would encourage the development of United States fisheries
for underutilized species. United States fishermen have tradi:
18 Japanese, for example, derive more than 50 percent of their protein from fish products,
id. at 111-18. Japan and Korea are also major exporters of fisheries products, U.S. DEP-T OF
COMMERCE, FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1978, Current Fisheries Statistics No. 7800, at
32 (1979).
19 See Kaczynski, Joint Ventures in Fisheries between Distant-water and Developed
Coastal Nations: An Economic View, 5 OCEAN MANAGEMENT 39, at 41, 45 (1979).
toId.
11 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1334, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
" See Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 233 (statement of Dr. Walter Pereyra).
23 Id.
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tionally shunned species such as hake and pollock because of the
low value and the lack of processors or markets; processors, on
the other hand, have never been convinced that United States
fishermen possessed the experience or technology to catch
economically significant amounts of underutilized species. Joint
ventures, it has been hypothesized, would actually aid the
development of both sectors by giving fishermen experience in
new fisheries and by creating confidence in the processors that an
adequate supply of underutilized species will be available to
justify new investment and expansion.24
Although the FCMA of 1976 provided that processing and sup-
port ships are "fishing vessels" for purposes of the Act25 and,
therefore, subject to the permitting system applicable to all
foreign fishing vessels," the FCMA did not deal with the possibility
of foreign processing ships conducting fishing operations with
United States fishermen. When two applications for foreign pro-
cessing ships to receive United States harvested fish were received
in 1977, the applications were not acted upon because of the need
to consider and evaluate alternatives and to develop a policy gov-
erning such ventures.27
After extensive public hearings in the summer of 1977,8 the
Department of Commerce through the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) issued a proposed interim
policy statement on February 8, 1978, which provided for approval
of foreign vessel permits to purchase or receive United States
harvested fish in the FCZ. Permits were to be granted only if the
optimum yield of the concerned fishery would not be exceeded,
the harvesting capacity of United States fishermen would exceed
domestic goals and capability to process such fish, and the foreign
vessel had the capability and intent to process the fish.' Com-
ments to the proposed policy questioned the legal authority of
NOAA to base a permitting system on a United States processor
preference and suggested the policy was contrary to the purposes
of the FCMA because it inhibited the development of new
" Public Hearings on Joint Venture Regulations, Mar. 13, 1979 (statement of Dr. Walter
Pereyra). See 44 Fed. Reg. 7708 (1979).
21 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(11) (1976).
" Id. § 1821(a)(3).
" See H. REP., supra note 21, at 4.
" U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, reprinted in Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 34-35.
" See National Marine Fisheries Service Proposed Interim Policy, 43 Fed. Reg. 5398
(1978).
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fisheries for underutilized species by restricting markets. 0 After
considering the comments on the proposed policy and reassess-
ment, however, NOAA determined that the FCMA did not give it
a "clear legislative direction" to adopt a policy or permit approval
system based upon factors not directly related to conservation
and management.'
This radical reversal of policy opened the way for approval of
pending joint venture applications and enlarged the apparent
loophole in the law to the point that all processors, not just new
processors of underutilized species, could find themselves in
direct competition with foreign processing vessels in the FCZ.
The policy reversal stimulated just the swift legislative response
that the announcement apparently was intended to invoke. Con-
gress acted immediately to provide NOAA with the authority to
regulate ventures and created a domestic processor preference
similar to the priority given to United States fishermen in the
FCZ.2
III. PROVISIONS OF THE 1978 AMENDMENTS TO THE FCMA
The most basic provision of the 1978 amendments to the FCMA
is the clarification of Congressional intent that all segments of the
United States fishing industry, including processors, benefit from
the establishment of the fishery conservation zone.3 In order to
achieve this goal, the amendments in effect create a three tiered
priority system for FCZ fishery resources which will govern the
issuance of permits for foreign processing vessels.' First priority
is given to the United States fishing industry for fish harvested
and processed domestically. Second priority is given to joint ven-
tures in which United States harvested fish is delivered to foreign
processing vessels. Foreign fishermen are given the lowest prior-
ity.5 Followp)ng these guidelines, permits for foreign processing
vessels can/be issued only for that part of the optimum yield of a
fishery which will not be utilized by United States processors."
"o 43 Fed. Reg. 20532 (1978).
" Id. See also Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 9, at 16-17 (statement of James P.
Walsh, Deputy Administrator, NOAA).
"2 Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519 (1978).
" See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(b)(6), 1824(b)(6)(B)(ii) (1976). In addition to establishing a pro-
cessor preference, the amendments also provide that the entire fishing industry should be
encouraged to develop fisheries in underutilized species.
" H. REP., supra note 21, at 6; S. REP. No. 95-935, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
, H. REP., supra note 21, at 6.
Id. See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(6)(B)(ii) (1976).
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The amendments also require that certain information concern-
ing the fish processing industry to be included in fishery manage-
ment plans which are prepared by the Regional Fishery Manage-
ment Councils. 7 In addition to determinations of optimum yield,
domestic harvesting capacity and the allowable level of foreign
fishing, fishery management plans must now include an assess-
ment of the "capacity and extent to which United States fish pro-
cessors will process United States harvested fish."38
Original versions of the amendments provided that a foreign
country's tariff and nontariff barriers to the importation of fish
products be considered as a factor in the allocation of fish among
nations and the issuance of permits to foreign fishing vessels, in-
cluding processing vessels which participate in joint ventures. 9
The administration objected to the provisions on the basis that
they conflicted with United States policy to reduce barriers to in-
ternational trade.'0 Although the provisions were deleted from the
final version of the bill, the amendments nevertheless require that
the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce and State Depart-
ments submit an annual report to the President and Congress on
the allocations of fish to foreign countries and the tariff and non-
tariff barriers imposed on the importation of such fish from the
United States. 1
IV. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMENDMENTS
A. The Processor Priority
Perhaps the only provision of the Joint Venture Amendments
which is unambiguous in application is the restriction which pro-
hibits foreign processing vessels from receiving those fish species
which are fully utilized by American processors. 2 Among the
species which are clearly not within the scope of joint ventures
are salmon, king crab, halibut, surf clams, menhaden, lobster and
shrimp. These species are fully utilized by United States pro-
17 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1853(a)(4)(c)-(a)(5) (1976). The FCMA established eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils composed of State officials, members of the public with knowledge of
or experience in commercial or recreational fishing and the regional director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service. The major function of the Councils is the preparation of manage-
ment plans for fisheries in their geographic areas. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852(a)-(b)-(h) (1976).
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1853(a)(4)(c)-(a)(5) (1976).
See H. REP., supra note 21, at 2-3.
40 Statement of the President on Signing H.R. 10732 into Law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1479 (Aug. 29, 1978).
,'16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(f) (1976).
42 Id. § 1824(b)(6)(B)(i)-(ii).
41 See H. REP., supra note 21, at 6; see also S. REP., supra note 34, at 5-6.
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cessors and the amendments give the processors an absolute
monopoly on such species regardless of price."
In the case of species for which the United States' processing
capacity is relatively low, such as hake, pollock, and squid,"5 the
nature of the processor preference is less clear. Although United
States processors technically are given a priority for all the fish
that they have the capacity and intent to process, a problem
arises over how to maintain that priority in areas where there is
direct competition from joint ventures. Studies have shown that
even when a joint venture and onshore processors pay the same
price per pound of fish, fishermen can make a greater profit by
delivering to the joint venture because of a more favorable ratio
of fishing time to delivery time, more efficient delivery techniques
and savings on fuel and ice." The legislative history indicates that
it is not necessary for fishermen to fulfill the requirements of
United States processors before fish may be delivered to process-
ing vessels, and that fishermen have the right to refuse to deliver
to processors if the fishermen are unsatisfied with the terms of-
fered by the processors.47 In other words, for underutilized species,
the amendment establishes a processor priority for fishery alloca-
tions but in no way creates the same type of captive market that
exists for fully utilized species, nor does it guarantee that an-
ticipated levels of fish will be delivered to United States pro-
cessors. When one also considers that most United States
fishermen have a certain amount of flexibility and are not
restricted to one fishery, merely limiting fishery allocations to
joint ventures does not necessarily benefit the onshore processor
of underutilized species; fishermen may change to an alternate
fishery rather than resort to less economically viable onshore
markets. Given these facts, it is difficult to ascertain whether pro-
cessors of underutilized species have been given any priority at
all."
" 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(6)(B)(i) (1976). See also H. REP., supra note 21, at 10. "With respect
to the determination of U.S. processing capacity and intent, the committee does not intend
that U.S. processors demonstrate an ability to outbid the price or other contract provisions
offered by foreign processors in order to establish capacity and intent."
" H. REP., supra note 21, at 6.
" See, e.g., Presentation to the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council on the Sub-
ject of Joint Ventures by Sig Jaeger, Mgr., North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners Associa-
tion, at 5-9 (Aug. 5-6, 1977).
4" See H. REP., supra note 21, at 9-10.
" It seems anomalous that the amendments would provide the least protection to the
segment of the processing industry that the FCMA singled out in its purposes to en-
courage, see 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(6) (1976). It must be noted, however, that although depen-
dent upon each other, fishermen and processors are generally in contentious positions. The
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B. Determinations of Capacities and Allocations
In order to determine if allocations will be available for joint
ventures, several closely interrelated determinations of capacity
must be made by the Fishery Management Councils. After the op-
timum yield (OY) for a fishery is fixed, domestic harvesting capacity
(DHC) is the first determination that must be made. The dif-
ference between the OY and DHC may be allocated to foreign
fleets by the Department of State. 9 The domestic processing
capacity must then be ascertained in order to determine whether
any of the DHC will be available for joint ventures. 0
In fisheries for underutilized species, however, the determina-
tions have not always followed this logical progression. The
limiting factor in harvesting underutilized species has generally
not been insufficiency of stocks or lack of skill in the fisheries (i.e.,
how many fish could be caught), but simply an absence of markets
and correspondingly low prices. The DHC for underutilized
species, therefore, has been fixed by the domestic processing
capacity.51 When joint ventures provide additional markets, there
is an initial difficulty in determining the effect on the DHC. If the
availability of markets is the major limiting factor, joint venture
advocates contend that the DHC can be calculated by merely add-
ing the domestic processing capacity and the amount of fish that
can be processed by joint ventures.2 Processors, however,
disagree with this method because it automatically creates alloca-
tions for joint ventures but does not take into account whether
the availability of new markets will lure fishermen from fisheries
for more valuable species or provide any priority or protection for
United States processors. The processors argue that determina-
captive United States market that exists for fully utilized species is nevertheless a fair one
for fishermen in most cases because of internal competition. This argument would not apply
to the same extent for underutilized species because without external competition from
joint ventures fishermen would be subject to terms and conditions unilaterally established
by the relatively few processors of underutilized species. The amendments were clearly not
intended to put fishermen at that kind of disadvantage in the market.
,9 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(4)(B) (1976).
50 Id. § 1824(b)(6)(B)(ii) and § 1853(a)(4)(C).
SI See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, BACKGROUND PAPER-PUBLIC HEARING ON
INTERIM PART 602 REGULATIONS, at 4 (Mar. 13, 1979, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as
NMFS BACKGROUND PAPER].
" W. Pereyra, Comments by Marine Resources Company of Seattle, Washington, on In-
terim Guidelines for Development of Fishery Management Plans at 8 (Mar. 10, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Marine Resources Comments].
" Letter from Edward W. Furia to Terry L. Leitzell at 5-7 (June 4, 1979) (comments on
Guidelines for Development of Fishery Management Plans, 44 Fed. Reg. 7708 (1979))
[hereinafter cited as Furia Comments].
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tions of DHC must be based on an independent assessment of em-
pirical data because overestimates of DHC will substantially in-
jure the development of shore-based processors.'
Another factor limiting foreign activity in the FCZ is the
amount of fish which will be utilized by the United States process-
ing industry. This determination is not a simple measurement of
the potential physical productivity of processors, but an assess-
ment of the processors' actual intent to utilize a species." Con-
sideration must be given to such factors as historical production,
geographical area,' the effect of seasonal fisheries or processing
schedules, evidence of expansion of facilities to accommodate
underutilized species and contracts with fishermen for the pur-
chase of particular species.57
The initial problem involved in this type of assessment is the
financial and administrative burden of compiling and evaluating
the enormous amounts of information required." Although every
fishery management plan must include a determination of the
"capacity and extent" to which United States processors will
utilize the species," NMFS has recognized that the amount and
type of information necessary to make such a determination
varies with the fishery."0 Many processors also have suggested
that the procedure would be considerably expedited if NMFS
declared certain species to be "totally utilized by United States
See New England Fish Co. v. Kreps, No. 79-1196 (D.D.C., filed May 1, 1979).
" See S. REP., supra note 34, at 5.
The species involved in underutilized fisheries deteriorate rapidly and require almost
immediate processing to maintain quality. Geographical factors, therefore, become very im-
portant in determining processing capacity for these fisheries.
' See S. REP., supra note 34, at 5; H. REP., supra note 21, at 9-10.
In addition to the reporting requirements and the apparent burden of proof placed on
processors, the assessments required by the amendments will add to the already cumber-
some duties of the Regional Fishery Management Councils. For example, the eight Regional
Councils are responsible for developing approximately 70 fishery management plans
(FMP's) and, as of June 1979, 14 of the plans had been implemented, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
COUNCIL MEMORANDUM, at 8-11 (June 1979). Assessments of processor capacity and intent to
utilize a species must not only be included in new FMP's, but must be amended to plans
already in place and reassessed at least once each year.
5' 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a)(4)(C) (1976).
60 In early proposed regulations to implement the Joint Venture Amendments, NOAA
specified that FMP's must require certain information from processors including price,
markets, amount of fish purchased or processed and seasonal, quantity or quality limita-
tions, 43 Fed. Reg. 49023, 49024 (1978). Interim regulations which followed left reporting re-
quirements to the discretion of the Councils, 44 Fed. Reg. 7708, 7709 (1979). Obviously much
more information is required in fisheries where the possibility of joint ventures exists.
However, since these fisheries are relatively few, it would be extremely inefficient to re-
quire the same reporting requirements of all processors.
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processors" and eliminated any processor reporting requirements
for such species."
A second problem with such an assessment involves the kind of
information that processors will be required to report. Processors
question the relevance of some of the disclosed information to
determinations of processing capacity and are dissatisfied with
present methods for preserving the confidentiality of reported in-
formation. 2 The most contentious items in the reporting re-
quirements are the price paid for fish and market information."
The processors point out that their priority exists regardless of
price"4 and, therefore, price is not a relevant consideration in
determining processors' capacity and intent. As discussed above,
however, fishermen are not required to sell to United States pro-
cessors if they cannot agree upon terms." Thus, price may be a
significant indicator of whether processors have the requisite "in-
tent" to process, ie., whether processors intend to offer prices
competitive with joint ventures and more traditional fisheries.
Processors raise similar arguments concerning the relevance of
market information. Obviously processors will not buy fish they
cannot sell, and there are few markets for underutilized species in
the United States.6 Furthermore, export markets have been
limited by tariff and nontariff barriers and by the relatively poor
quality of the American product. 7 Evidence of actual markets,
then, would clearly help establish a processor's intent to utilize a
certain species with limited marketability.
St See, e.g., Testimony of William W. Solomon, National Food Processors Association, on
Interim Final Regulations Implementing the Domestic Processor Preference under Pub. L.
No. 95-354, at 3-4 (Mar. 13, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Solomon Testimony]; Testimony of
Robert F. Morgan, Pacific Seafood Processors Association, at 2-5 (May 7, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Morgan Testimony].
" See 44 Fed. Reg. 7708, 7709 (1979).
3 Id.
" See id.; H. REP., supra note 21, at 10.
" See text at note 47 supra.
" The major market in the United States for underutilized species such as hake and
pollock is in the form of frozen blocks for making fish sticks and similar products. The
United States imports almost all the frozen blocks used. FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
1978, supra note 18, at xii, 43.
67 Although many countries presently fish in the FCZ for species that are underutilized
by the United States, few of these countries represent viable markets for exportation of
those species from the United States. Because many of the species are highly perishable or
change characteristics if not promptly processed, meeting quality standards is an initial
hurdle, but tariff and nontariff barriers, such as quotas and licenses, often create the
greatest restrictions on exportation to many countries. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
REPORT FOR 1978 ON FISHERY ALLOCATIONS, PERMITS, AND FOREIGN IMPORT BARRIERS (July 1,
1979).
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Perhaps more telling than the relevancy objection is the one con-
cerning confidentiality. Because data concerning markets and other
sensitive information is proprietary in nature and may cause
economic damage if revealed prematurely, processing firms may
be justified in questioning the confidentiality of data submitted to
NMFS for capacity determinations. The Fishery Management
Councils, which must evaluate the information in order to assess
processors' capacity and intent, are themselves composed of com-
petitive processors and other members of the fishing industry
that might benefit from the information. Although data is submit-
ted to the Councils for NMFS only in aggregated form,68 the fact
that few firms are expanding into new fisheries in a given area
would tend to reveal the source of the information. Because of this
probable breach of confidentiality and the ensuing conflict of in-
terest problems created within the Councils, processors insist that
such proprietary information should not be included in reporting
requirements. 9
A final problem which arises is how to redistribute allocations if
processors clearly will not reach projected assessments of capa-
city. When United States fishermen have not been able to catch
their projected capacity or use reserves set aside to absorb an-
ticipated growth in a fishery, suirplus stocks have been reallocated
to foreign fishermen." If processors cannot reach projected levels,
there are two alternatives for reallocation-joint ventures and
foreign fishermen. The three tiered system established by the Joint
Venture Amendments clearly gives priority to joint ventures if
domestic harvesting capacity exists.7 Some processors view the
possibility of such a reallocation to joint ventures as the final step
in undermining the domestic processor priority for underutilized
species. 2 It has been suggested that if such reallocations are made
to foreign fishermen rather than joint ventures, there would be
more incentive for United States fishermen to deliver to domestic
processors. 3 No legislative authority exists, however, to justify
the reallocation of fish to foreigners if domestic harvesting capacity
exists.
" See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(d) (1976).
" See 44 Fed. Reg. 7708, 7709 (1979); Solomon Testimony, supra note 61, at 7-8; Morgan
Testimony, supra note 61, at 11-12; NMFS BACKGROUND PAPER. supra note 51, at 3.
70 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 18028 (1979).
"' See text at note 34 supra.
7 See, e.g., Furia Comments, supra note 53, at 14.
73 Id,
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C. Restrictions and Conditions
In addition to establishing quota limitations on foreign fishing
consistent with fishery management plans, the Secretary of Com-
merce may impose on foreign fishermen "any other condition or
restriction related to fishery conservation and management which
... [is] necessary and appropriate."7 These additional conditions
are generally time, geographic area and gear restrictions to
reduce bycatch.
The Joint Ventures Amendments did not change the language
of the FCMA which relates conditions and restrictions on foreign
fishing to conservation and management of the resource. 5 This is
the same kind of language that NOAA interpreted not to allow a
foreign permit approval system based upon a domestic processor
preference."' The legislative history of the Joint Venture Amend-
ments, however, indicates that restrictions should also be imposed
to ensure compliance with the objectives of the amendments.77
The Senate Report, for example, states that "as long as the in-
terests of the U.S. harvesters are not significantly affected, the
Secretary may consider imposing geographical restrictions on the
areas in which foreign processing vessels may operate in order to
foster the development of temporarily vulnerable or developing
onshore processing facilities."" One must assume, therefore, that
the term "fishery management" must be applied broadly within
the context of the amended purposes of the FCMA "to encourage
the development of fisheries which are currently underutilized or
not utilized by the United States fishing industry . .. ."'
Time and area limitations of foreign processing vessels seem to
be an obvious means of protecting the processor priority in a
given area. Such restrictions in reality must be viewed as limita-
tions on United States fishermen in addition to foreign processors
7 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(7)(F) (1976).
73 1d
7' See 43 Fed. Reg. 20532 (1978).
S. REP., supra note 43, at 4.
78 Id.
-' 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(6) (1976), as amended by Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-354, § 2(b) (as
amended). The dismissal of a recent case involving joint venture permits and allocations,
see note 54 supra, was based on a stipulation of settlement the FCMA will not be construed
to deny the Secretary of Commerce the discretionary authority to impose conditions and
restrictions on joint venture permits if "necessary and appropriate, and relate to fishery
conservation and management (which includes .... the development by the United States
fishing industry [of underutilized or unutilized fisheries])." New England Fish Co. v. Kreps,
No. 79-1196 (D.D.C., Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal, Jan. 3, 1980).
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and as such may be detrimental to the development of fisheries
for underutilized species. If, for example, joint ventures in Alaska
are limited to the Bering Sea in order to foster growth of the on-
shore processing industry around the Gulf of Alaska, United
States fishermen may indeed be discouraged from participating in
joint ventures because of the distance and other related problems.
Such restrictions have no reciprocal benefit, however, because
they provide no positive encouragement for fishermen to enter an
underutilized fishery in the Gulf of Alaska.
The experience of Marine Resources Company, 0 a joint venture
off the coast of Washington, suggests that joint ventures may, in
fact, have a positive effect on the development of onshore process-
ing. Fishermen who have participated in the Marine Resources
joint venture have been able to develop a profitable fishery for
Pacific hake and are now capable of providing a steady supply of
hake to both the joint venture and a new onshore processor. 1
Since it appears that onshore processors can take advantage of
joint ventures' experiments in new fisheries without risking any
initial investment 2 it would be a mistake to relegate joint ven-
tures, especially during a period of development, to remote areas
where United States processing capacity is unlikely to develop.
D. International Trade Barriers
Although the final version of the Joint Venture Amendments
deleted provisions which would require the Secretary of Com-
merce to consider tariff and other artificial trade restrictions in
approving applications for joint ventures," the amendments did
provide that in making such decisions, "the Secretary may take into
account, with respect to the foreign nation concerned, such other
matters as the Secretary deems appropriate."" The question of
whetheifthe Secretary should consider foreign trade barriers in
approving joint ventures, therefore, remains an open question.
Congress and most factions of the fishing industry believe it is
inconsistent to allocate surplus fish to countries which have
SO Marine Resources Company is a joint venture of Sovrybflot, an agency of the Soviet
Ministry of Fisheries, and Bellingham Cold Storage of Washington.
" Public Hearings on Joint Venture Regulations, Mar. 13, 1979, Washington, D.C. (state-
ment of Walter Pereyra, Marine Resources Company, Barry Fisher, fisherman, and Daniel
Golden, Pacific Hake Fisheries, Inc., onshore processor) [hereinafter cited as Pereyra-
Fisher-Golden Statement].
" See U.S. OCEAN POLICY, supra note 12, at 111-33.
" See note 40 supra.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(6)(B)(iii) (1976).
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established artificial trade barriers86 to restrict or prohibit impor-
tation from the United States of the same species of fish." Such
trade barriers are perceived as major obstacles to development of
fisheries and processing capacity for underutilized species in the
United States, because the trade limitations severely restrict ac-
cess to new markets for United States processed fish."
Because of continued pressure from Congress to tie foreign
fishing allocations to market concessions and to forestall the
possibility of Congress enacting specific legislation to that effect,
the Commerce Department has apparently conceded that access
to foreign markets at least should be one consideration in foreign
fishing allocations.88 However, it is unlikely that the Secretary of
Commerce will base approval of permits or distribution of alloca-
tions to joint ventures on such criteria. As an alternative, the
Department of Commerce and other federal agencies are examin-
ing potential foreign markets for underutilized species,89 research-
ing marketing techniques for the creation of new domestic
markets" and actively negotiating to reduce or eliminate foreign
trade barriers to the importation of underutilized species.'
V. CURRENT JOINT VENTURES
Although rumors of joint ventures abound, only two joint ven-
tures are currently operating. Both are located on the Pacific
coast of the United States.92 Marine Resources Company is an
" See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY. REPORT FOR 1978 ON FISHERY ALLOCATIONS. PERMITS. AND
FOREIGN IMPORT BARRIERS (July 1, 1979). Artificial trade barriers include excessive tariffs,
quota restrictions, import licensing, consular fees, custom surtaxes, inspection fees and
health certificates.
"' See H. REP.. supra note 21, at 7-8, 10; S. REP., supra note 34, at 3.
67 Id.
" MARINE FISH MANAGEMENT. Dec. 1979, at 6. For example, the Commerce Department
has recommended that the State Department withhold 50,000 tons of Japan's 750,000 ton
pollock allocation pending discussions with Japan concerning alleviation of trade barriers.
" See U.S. OCEAN POLICY. supra note 12, at 111-34.
90 Id.
" The multilateral trade negotiations, for example, have produced significant tariff
reductions and quota concessions from Japan. Other countries that have reduced fisheries
tariffs are Canada, the EEC countries, Finland and Sweden. Saft, Multilateral Trade
Negotiations May Bring Down Barriers to Overseas Trade, NAT'L FISHERMAN, July 1979, at
20-21.
" On the East coast, a proposed joint venture for squid involving Fass Brothers, a
mid-Atlantic fishing company, and an Italian fishing firm has not materialized. Amfish, a
partnership between the Fisheries Development Corporation of New York and a domestic
subsidiary of an Italian fishing firm; Amoruso, has sought revision of shipping laws to allow
squid caught by Italian fishing-processing vessels to be landed in U.S. ports. A joint venture
between Japanese processing vessels and U.S. fishermen for the harvest of squid has been
proposed for the New England area.
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American corporation formed by Bellingham Cold Storage of
Washington and Sovrybflot, a special agency of the Soviet
Ministry of Fisheries. 3 The second joint venture is between the
Korean Marine Industry Development Corporation (KMIDC) and
R.A. Davenny and Associates of Alaska."
The Marine Resources operation involves primarily Pacific hake
which is purchased from United States fishermen and processed
aboard leased Soviet processing vessels in the FCZ off the coast of
Washington and Alaska. All of the processed products are ex-
ported. In spite of initial adverse reaction, this joint venture has
been successful in terms of developing a viable fishery for Pacific
hake, demonstrating that United States fishermen can fish pro-
fitably for a low value underutilized species and cooperating with
the development of onshore processors."' Marine Resources has
gained the approval of the Pacific Fisheries Management Council
and the support of major fishermen's groups, which originally op-
posed joint ventures on the ground that the short term economic
benefits to fishermen would be outweighed by the disincentive to
development of onshore industry and the uncertainties created by
the dependence on foreign processing vessels. 7 The success in the
fishery and the nurturing of good relations tend to ensure the con-
tinued development of Marine Resources.
The KMIDC-Davenny joint venture for pollock in the Gulf of
Alaska encountered early problems with bad weather conditions
and poor performance of catcher boats. 8 Although proponents of
the joint venture are optimistic, it is impossible to ascertain
whether the venture will attain the same success as Marine
Resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment in 1976, the FCMA has proved to contain
numerous loopholes. NOAA's decision that the agency lacked
93 Gorham, An Investigation of Joint U.S./Foreign Ventures in the Developing Commer-
cial Fishery in Alaska, UNIV. OF ALASKA SEA GRANT REPORT 78-7 (1978), at 17-19; Heg-
gelund, U.S.-Foreign Joint Ventures in the Northeast Pacific, ALASKA SEAS AND COASTS.
Feb. 1978, at 10-12 [hereinafter cited as Heggelund].
" See note 93 supra.
"5 Marine Resources Comments, supra note 52, at 1-2.
" Pereyra-Fisher-Golden Statement, supra note 81.
'" See Marine Resources Comments, supra note 52, at 2; cf. Heggelund, supra note 93, at
12 and DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Summary of Joint Venture Hearings (Northwest Region) July
1977, at 8, 12.
" Letter from Robert C. Ely, counsel to KMIDC-Davenny joint venture, to Terry
Leitzell, NOAA Asst. Administrator for Fisheries (Nov. 14, 1978), at 3, 5.
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authority to regulate joint ventures spurred Congress to act on
that particular loophole. In the wake of the fishing industry's
typically strong reaction to any type of foreign involvement in
United States fisheries, Congress acted expeditiously, but
perhaps not as effectively as intended. The intent of Congress to
create a United States processor priority for fish in the FCZ is
clear, but Congress failed to provide sufficiently clear guidelines
for implementation of the preference. Congress' attempt to
establish a processor preference, while at the same time maintain-
ing a fair market for United States fishermen which would attain
optimum utilization of the resource, has resulted in confusing and
ambiguous signals to NOAA, the agency responsible for im-
plementation of the amendments. NOAA's delay in developing
final regulations" clearly is not an example of federal inefficiency
but rather a conscientious effort to resolve the ambiguities of the
statute and its legislative history by using an interim policy and
encouraging public participation. It is possible that the problems
which exist cannot be resolved through legislation. Further guid-
ance from Congress may be necessary before final implementation
of the Joint Venture Amendments can be realized.
" NOAA issued Proposed Guidelines on October 20, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 49023 (1978). In-
terim Regulations were published February 7, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 7708 (1979). A public hear-
ing was held March 13, 1979. Proposed final regulations have not yet been issued.
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